




























































Financial contagion is defined as an increase in the absolute value of cross-market correlations after 
a crisis (Forbes and Rigobon, 1999). The objective of this work is to analyze empirically if the 
Brexit shock produced a financial contagion into some of the most important Europe’s financial 
markets. In order to do so, the log-returns of the stock market indexes of  the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany (the two main representative countries of the Euro area and, at the same time, 
the main commercial partners of the United Kingdom) are used for a period between, 
approximately, the end of the Euro crisis in 2012 and February 2019. The idea is to use a 
sufficiently long period of time before and after the Brexit to ascertain if relevant changes in 
volatility and correlations were observed. The econometric methodology used was the following: 
after standard descriptive statistics and stationarity analysis, a trivariate VAR was estimated to 
account for the temporal dependence and dynamic interrelationships of the data. Then, a 
multivariate GARCH was estimated simultaneously with the identified VAR to model the 
conditional heteroskedasticity which is regularly observed in financial time series due to the 
volatility clustering phenomenon. Finally, the fitted conditional correlations and standard deviations 
were extracted from the VAR-MGARCH model. To test for the financial contagion possibly caused 
by the Brexit, a regression model for the conditional correlations and standard deviations was 
estimated by OLS with a dummy variable assuming unitary value on the occurrence of relevant 
Brexit-related information and a standard t-test was performed to evaluate the statistical 
significance of the coefficient. Moreover, to complement this statistical procedure, the averages of 
conditional correlations and standard deviations calculated sequentially along temporal sub-samples 
were compared. Both procedures resulted in sound statistical evidence that, in fact, the Brexit shock 
caused financial contagion on the analyzed financial stock markets. 
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The decision of the United Kingdom of leaving the European Union is one of the main 
events of our time: almost every day, since 2016, we have had news about how the process of 
separation from the European Union is developing. This happens because the Brexit has been and 
will be a pervasive shock capable of affecting our lives: it is about the exit of one of the most 
advanced economies from the richest and widest area of single market in the world. In summary, 
the Brexit is a historical event and, as such, deserves analysis. 
  The nature of the shock is twofold being both economic and political: on the one hand, flows 
of people, goods and financial instruments might be limited between the continent and the United 
Kingdom; on the other hand, the exit from the EU may trigger or strengthen centrifugal forces both 
in the United Kingdom and the European Union. One of the main immediate and current 
consequences of these scenarios is uncertainty around the future, a variable that in economy, and 
even more in finance, is crucial for economic agents to make decisions: the Brexit, despite not being 
a closed process, may have already had a dramatic impact on the financial markets of Europe. 
Therefore, this work aims to understand whether the choice of the United Kingdom of 
leaving the European Union may have caused significant variations in the European financial stock 
markets. The focus is on the effects of the Brexit on the Eurozone stock markets given that, firstly, 
the Euro area is the most important monetary and economic sub-sample within the EU and, 
secondly, it is interesting to study the effects of a shock originated in a country that is not part of the 
monetary union. The basic objective of this dissertation is, in summary, to understand if the Brexit 
caused  financial contagion in the Eurozone by using, as a sample, some of the most relevant Euro 
area’s financial stock markets. 
Answering the question as to whether the Brexit can be seen as a case of financial contagion 
for the Euro area is relevant for our understanding of international relationships. If the Brexit 
produces contagion, we can conclude that the level of interdependence of the European states is so 
deep that, independently of the political decision of staying out or in the Union, policy makers must 
understand that cooperation and integration are necessary and unavoidable to guarantee everyone’s 
benefit. With regard to this point it is, furthermore, proper to make an observation: given that taking 
the Brexit as a shock that may have caused contagion means that the direction of causality flows 
clearly from the United Kingdom to the Eurozone, someone could argue that there would not be any 
necessity for the country from which the shock comes to seek more coordination with the countries 
affected. Even if this statement in principle can be true, especially in the case that the country 
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producing the shock is far bigger than the countries affected by the shock, nevertheless, evidence of 
contagion simply means an intrinsically strong interdependence which, reasonably, can let us 
suppose that the causality in the future, for some reason, may reverse its direction: therefore, it is 
reasonable to suppose that in the future the United Kingdom, because of its small size and 
interdependence with Europe, may be affected by shocks originated in the European Union.  
As for the Brexit as a possible source of financial contagion, to my knowledge, no paper has 
been published yet and the choice of my topic is, thus, one of the main innovations introduced by 
my work. However, studies of financial contagion cases already exist. Here follow two works to 
which the idea of this work owes much and which inspired the methodology of this paper.  
Firstly, Forbes and Rigobon (1999) defined the increase of cross-market correlation during the 
turmoil as financial contagion and analyzed the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican 
peso collapse and the 1997 East Asian crises trying to find evidence of contagion. For each of the 
three crises, they divided, first, the respective sample period into several temporal intervals: some 
intervals were considered as “normal” periods, whereas others as periods of turmoil during which 
the hypothesis of financial contagion was possible. Then, they calculated the coefficients of 
correlations based on the selected model specification taking into account the heteroskedasticity 
phenomenon. In the end, they compared the adjusted correlation coefficients with those of the 
normal periods getting no evidence of contagion.  
Secondly, Mitra, Iyer, and Joseph (2015), focused, instead, more on volatility than cross-market 
correlation to explain contagion between financial markets. In their work, they attempted to track 
the transmission of volatility across the ten main stock markets in the world during a period of 
twenty years. To capture the volatility spillover effect from one market to the other, they resorted to 
a bivariate GARCH model (more specifically a VAR-EGARCH specification). They found that 
spillover between the international stock markets is persistent at all times and is not random in 95% 
of cases corroborating the so-called meteor shower hypothesis: present volatility of a stock market 
is function of past volatility from other market(s).  
The present work, following the example of Forbes and Rigobon (1999), focuses on the estimate of 
the cross-market correlations as well as tests the variation of average estimated correlations for 
sequential temporal sub-samples. Nevertheless, adopting the approach of Mitra, Yver and Joseph 
(2015), it also uses the volatility estimate as a key and primary variable to test directly contagion: 
consequently, according to the same approach used for sequential average correlations, sequential 
averages of volatility estimates are calculated. Moreover, following the example of Mitra, Yver and 
Joseph (2015) a VAR-MGARCH model has been used to allow for interdependence and 
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heteroskedasticity. Finally, given that the results provided by the calculation of the sequential 
averages of the correlation and volatility estimates depend on the size of the temporal sub-samples, 
a dummy variable, which assumes unitary value on the occurrence of Brexit events, has been 
introduced in order to test the estimates of correlations and volatilities in function of the Brexit 
shocks. 
In summary, this work introduces an innovation with regard to the topic, in that the Brexit as a case 
of financial contagion has not been studied yet, and an innovation with regard to the methodology 
attempting to unify the main approaches to the financial contagion measurement into one together 
with the addition of a dummy variable analysis. 
On the basis of the results just presented above, addressing the question as to whether the 
Brexit can be regarded as a cause of financial contagion turns into verifying if stock markets 
correlations and volatilities varied in a significant way due to some important events related to the 
process of separation from the European Union. In order to do so, first it is necessary to get these 
two variables from a reasonable sample in such a way that they can be used to test the hypothesis of 
contagion. That is the reason why I resorted to a VAR-MGARCH model: on the one side, the VAR 
part allows to model the interdependence between stock markets in a relatively simple way without 
the risk of specifying too complicated or too simple economic models; on the other side, the 
GARCH part allows to take into account the time-varying nature of volatility in stock markets. The 
result is, therefore, two robust estimates of the variables that are necessary to test the hypothesis of 
contagion. Testing the hypothesis of financial contagion due to the Brexit, at this stage, simply 
means to check if  information related to the Brexit can statistically explain shifts in the correlations 
and volatilities as well as determine if such a change is, in fact, significant in statistical and practical 
terms.   
The analysis presented in this work shows empirically that the Brexit behaved as a shock 
capable of producing contagion in the Eurozone. More specifically, utilizing a constant and a 
dummy with unitary value on the occurrence of crucial Brexit-related information as independent 
variables, the OLS regression for the conditional correlations and standard deviations drawn from 
the VAR-MGARCH model displays statistically significant coefficients for the dummy variable: 
therefore, the changes in conditional correlations and standard deviations during the sample period 
can be explained, causally, by the Brexit informational innovations. Moreover, the sequential sub-
sample averages for the conditional correlations and standard deviations show, in absolute terms, 
abrupt and intense variations during the temporal intervals with more flow of significant Brexit-
related events. In summary, volatilities and correlations between stock markets, the two key 
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variables to explain financial contagion, shift in a statistically significant way because of the Brexit 
events. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. In the first section, the idea of financial contagion 
as provided by the literature is reviewed. More in detail, definitions and ways to measure financial 
contagion are listed. The second section summarizes the chronological path that lead to the Brexit: 
dates of remarkable importance are presented on which significant variations in correlations and 
volatilities may have occurred. In the third section, the database is described.  
The fourth section explains the econometric analysis that was carried out in order to get evidence of 
financial contagion: first of all, I created the series of log returns from the returns of the stock 
market indexes of the United Kingdom, France and Germany and realized a graphical analysis. 
Then, to complete the first step of my analysis, I created a dummy variable linked to the Brexit that 
took unitary value on the occurrence of remarkable Brexit-related events. Secondly, I checked the 
stationarity of the series created and the most suitable error distribution model. Thirdly, I ran a 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model after carrying out an optimal number of lags selection in order 
to take into account the interdependence amongst all the stock markets involved in the analysis. In 
the following step , I realized a GARCH model upon the VAR to account for the heteroskedasticity 
exhibited by the financial time-series, the so-called volatility clustering effect. Several kinds of 
GARCH models were tested: the model chosen was the one which minimized the information 
criteria. Finally, I carried out a test on the MGARCH model to prevent residual ARCH effects from 
being still active. Using the VAR-MGARCH model above-mentioned, therefore, I drew the 
conditional correlations and standard deviations for the sample period. The final step of the analysis 
was to create an OLS model for the conditional correlations and volatilities in function of a constant 
and the dummy linked to the Brexit events. Using this model, the significance of the dummy 
variable was tested. Moreover, a sequential analysis of the value of the average of the VAR-
MGARCH conditional correlations and standard deviations was carried out. The fifth and last 
section of my work, in the end, on the basis of the results from the above-mentioned tests, presents 
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2. Financial Contagion 
 
2.1 Definition of financial contagion 
 
  On the 23rd of June 2016, the United Kingdom expressed in a referendum its will of leaving 
the European Union. This event caused, immediately, sensible fluctuations in the main stock 
markets. In fact, this example showed how an important shock in a specific country with 
international impact may have noticeable effects on several financial markets independently of its 
size, structure or location. 
Nevertheless, temporary fluctuations in the volatility and correlations of financial stock 
markets after specific news events do not necessarily mean that there was a case of financial 
contagion. The existing literature provides several definitions of financial contagion and, 
consequently to the best of my knowledge, there does not exist consensus upon what financial 
contagion is. 
As a general idea, the contagion literature chose the criterion of correlation shift as the rule 
to set apart normal from contagious periods (Forbes and Rigobon, 1999). A relevant limitation of 
this criterion is that changes in correlation are quite natural during periods of innovation in 
regulation and financial technology, and increase in the number of market participants. Thus, 
correlation shifts, spillover effects and amplification processes can be at the same time either effects 
of financial contagion or processes endogenously generated inside the market. 
Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) listed five possible definitions of financial contagion: 
Definition 1 Contagion is a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one country, 
conditional on a crisis occurring in another country. 
This definition is usually linked to empirical research upon the international consequences due to 
plunge of exchange rate. It accounts for the fact that currency exchange rate crises involve an 
extended set of countries amongst which some can avoid contagion despite being affected by 
speculative attacks. Generally speaking, this is a really broad definition that can include all of the 
following. 
Definition 2 Contagion takes place when volatility spills over from the crisis-originating country to 
the financial markets of other countries.  
Asset price volatility occurs during periods of financial turmoil: crises are identified with peaks in 
volatility and contagion is measured as volatility spillovers from one country to another. Hence, 
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contagion is a significant simultaneous rise in volatility in different markets not due to just simple 
interdependence. Since volatility is regarded as a good approximation of uncertainty in finance, 
contagion is basically related to the spread of uncertainty through the financial markets. Such 
definition corroborates the following. 
Definition 3 Contagion is a significant increase in co-movements  of prices and quantities across 
markets, conditional on a crisis occurring in one market or group of markets. 
This definition stresses the quantitative dimension relating contagion to excessive co-movements in 
comparison with standard interdependence effects. The virtue of this definition is that it fits with 
what is commonly perceived as contagion in the context of the 2008 crisis following the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy. What is crucial is how to draw a distinction between ordinary and extra-
ordinary co-movements. 
Definition 4 Contagion occurs when the transmission channel is different after a shock in one 
market. 
 Shift contagion occurs if the transmission channel is intensified in response to a crisis in one 
country. For instance, it may be the case that some channels of crisis transmission are activated only 
during a shock. In general, it also means that contagion is not necessarily dependent on the idea of a 
tighter interdependence between countries, but it can just be explained by a different way of crisis 
transmission. This definition, as in the third definition, can be translated into excessive co-
movements in prices and quantity or into jumps between multiple equilibria (see Definition 5), but 
it also enables the inclusion of economic variables behavior discontinuities produced by learning 
processes, sudden and excessive reception of information or imitative behavior by market agents. 
Definition 5 Contagion occurs when co-movements cannot be explained by fundamentals. 
 The spread of a crisis arises in the presence of a coordination problem involving an arbitrary 
switch from one equilibrium to another one without fundamentals being able to explain the 
deviation. More precisely, this definition refers to models allowing multiple instantaneous equilibria 
in the presence of a coordination game: if the spread of a crisis reflects the arbitrary change from 
one equilibrium to another, fundamentals alone cannot explain the process; yet, they can explain 
why some countries are more vulnerable to crises than others. For example, in case of financial 
contagion via a liquidity crisis, countries whose relative level of international reserves in foreign 
currency is low are more likely to be hit. 
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Forbes and Rigobon (1999), similarly to the fourth definition above-mentioned, focused on 
the concept of shift contagion as defined as a change in the intensity of correlations between 
financial asset prices during a period of crisis.  
The third and the fifth definition exposed by Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) explained 
contagion as an excess of co-movements. Masson (1999) and Claessens (2001) used the same 
approach, investigating the cause of the excess of co-movements in the irrationality of operators, 
herd behavior and financial panic.  
Moreover, four stylized facts can be listed to corroborate the analysis of financial contagion 
through volatility and correlation shifts (Corsetti et al., 2010): 
(i) Financial crises are often related with an increase in covariances of returns between 
countries; 
(ii) Correlations of returns during crises often rise, but there are cases of crisis in which 
correlations decrease or remain at the same level: what matters is the variation in 
absolute terms; 
(iii) The occurrence of an unexpected downturn in stock market prices within a group of 
country; 
(iv) The evidence of the increase of volatility in concurrence with financial crises. 
 
2.2 Measurement of financial contagion 
 
In agreement with the definitions above-mentioned and literature review, to test and measure 
financial contagion after the Brexit shock, I decided to proceed as follows: estimate cross-market 
correlations and, then, verify whether or not a significant increase of correlation occurred after the 
shock. A significant increase in correlation is considered as statistical evidence favoring the 
hypothesis of financial contagion. The same idea, moreover, can be applied to another crucial 
variable, the volatility, namely to its approximation represented by the standard deviation. 
King and Wadhani (1990) resorted to such approach to test contagion amongst the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Japan after the 1987 downturn in the American stock market: rise 
in correlations level after the shock was taken as evidence of financial contagion. For the same 
crisis Forbes and Rigobon (1999), instead, used an estimate of correlation accounting for 
heteroskedasticity effects and found no evidence of contagion.  
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 Likewise, Lee and Kim (1993) applied the same methodology to a wider extent by analyzing 
twelve markets affected by the American 1987 downturn obtaining evidence of contagion, namely a 
70% increase in the after-shock correlation level. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) analyzed the effects of 
1994 Mexican crisis on emerging markets in terms of stock prices and sovereign bonds finding a 
relevant increase in cross-market correlations interpretable as financial contagion. 
A second common approach is based on ARCH and GARCH models for the estimation of 
volatility-driven mechanisms of transmission from one country to another: through these models it 
is possible to include the problem of change in volatility through time and consider the time-varying 
dimension of standard deviations and correlations. For example, through this approach, Edwards 
(1998) studied the possibility of contagion within the debentures markets after the Mexican peso 
crisis and observed significant spillovers between Argentina and Mexico, but not between Mexico 
and Chile, whereas Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990)  noticed the presence of statistically significant 
volatility spillovers from New York to London and Tokyo, and from London to Tokyo after the 
1987 American crisis.  
Other researchers resorted to direct measurement to explain financial contagion, namely they 
examined how several variables directly affected the vulnerability of one country to crisis. 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyploz (1996) used a probit model to estimate the probability of a crisis 
occurring for a set of industrialized countries from 1959 to 1993 finding that such probability is 
related to speculative attacks taking place in other countries at the same time.  Forbes (2000), using 
a different strategy, estimated the consequences of the Russian and Asian crises upon approximately 
ten thousand companies all over the world, concluding that commercial ties are key variables to 
explain vulnerability to financial shocks.  
Nevertheless, as many other papers do, such findings test the channels through which 
financial contagion may spread, not directly the existence of financial contagion itself. Moreover, 
specifying the whole set of explicative variables can be difficult: that is one of the reasons why 
researchers often resort to VAR models which avoid the need of model specification, but at the 
same time accounts for interdependence between financial markets. 
All the models presented so far are suitable to adjust the change in variance along time. Yet, 
they still have a problem in that the estimates of correlations for different sub-samples depend on 
the choice of the sub-samples themselves. One way to mitigate this drawback is to ascertain the 
statistical significance of the extremes of the temporal sub-samples by using a dummy variable 
dependent on key information related to the event analyzed. 
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The key points of financial contagion, therefore, can be summarized as follows: 
a) Volatility and correlations are the key variables to define and measure financial contagion; 
b) A reasonable way of measuring financial contagion is to calculate how correlations and 
volatility change sequentially along time from one period to another. Furthermore, dummy 
variables can help testing statistical significance of the impact of information on the 
occurrence of events reasonably capable of causing contagion; 
c) Interdependence between pairs of countries can be studied by a VAR model, which, besides, 
has the noticeable advantage of not needing model specification; 
d) Heteroskedasticity must be taken into consideration in analyzing financial contagion: 
GARCH models suit this need. 
For all these reasons, thus, the approach used in this analysis was to implement a VAR-
MGARCH model and test the change in volatility and correlation through time by using auxiliary 
dummies and sequential change in the averages. 
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3. The Brexit 
  
In order to better understand the temporal sample selection and the Brexit process itself, it is 
useful to briefly recapitulate the main steps that lead to the United Kingdom’s exit from the 
European Union: 
▪ 23th January 2013 – David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, states that he is in favor 
of a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU; 
▪ 22nd May 2014 – The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) led by Nigel Farage 
wins 26% of the votes in European elections and becomes the UK’s most important 
representation in the European Parliament. The party, whose main policy is to leave the EU, 
also gets large gains in local elections becoming one of the most relevant British parties; 
▪ 7th May 2015 – David Cameron wins the general British elections with a political program 
that includes the commitment to hold an in/out referendum; 
▪ 22nd February 2016 – David Cameron announces that the referendum on the UK remaining 
in or withdrawing from the EU will be held on the 23rd of June of the same year; 
▪ 23rd June 2016 – With 51.9% of the votes against and 48.1% for remaining in the EU, the 
referendum sees Leave campaigners win. David Cameron, because of that, resigns 
immediately as Prime Minister; 
▪ 13th July 2016 – Theresa May becomes the new British prime minister; 
▪ 27th July 2016 – Michel Barnier is nominated chief negotiator on behalf of the EU in the 
Brexit negotiation; 
▪ 8th September 2016 – Guy Verhostadt is nominated by the European Parliament to lead 
Parliament-related negotiations regarding Brexit; 
▪ 17th January 2017 – May gives a speech specifying the government’s Brexit plans; 
▪ 24th January 2017 – the Supreme Court states that the House of Commons must be 
consulted before the activation of the Article 50 which can kickstart the process of 
separation from the EU; 
▪ 2nd February 2017 – The UK government publishes for the first time since the referendum 
its white paper on the Brexit, officially declaring what direction it will take during 
negotiations with the European Union; 
▪ 29th March 2017 – The Article 50 is triggered, which starts the clock on the process of the 
UK leaving the EU; 
▪  8th April 2017 –The Prime Minister May calls a General Election for later in 2017; 
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▪ 8th June 2017 – Because of the unexpected call for general elections, Theresa May loses her 
majority in Parliament. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) makes a deal 
with the Conservatives and its votes allow Theresa May to stay in power; 
▪ 9th June 2017- Theresa May informs the Queen that she intends to form a government with 
the DUP; 
▪ 19th June 2017- The first round of UK-EU exit negotiations begins; 
▪ 26th June 2017 – Formal negotiations on withdrawal begin between the UK and the EU; 
▪ 2nd July 2017 – the UK announces abandonment of 1964 fishing convention; 
▪ 22nd September 2017 – In an attempt to break the political deadlock caused by the 
inexistence of a shared vision over the Brexit negotiations, Theresa May talks about several 
key points during a speech in Florence, Italy. She declares that important issues for the 
Brexit to succeed are a transition period, fishing grounds, the border between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland and leaving the single European market; 
▪ 23rd September 2017 – The American rating agency Moody’s downgrades UK’s rating 
from AA1 to AA2; 
▪ 10th November 2017 – Theresa May proposes UK’s exit date on the 29th March 2019; 
▪ 13th December 2017 – Rebel Tory MPs, because of contrasts with May’s government about 
the Brexit negotiations, side with the Opposition, forcing the government to guarantee a vote 
on the final Brexit deal; 
▪ 15th December 2017 – The EU agrees to move on to the second phase of negotiations after 
an agreement is reached on the Brexit divorce bill, Irish border and EU citizens’ rights; 
▪ 17th December 2017 – the European Union Referendum Act 2015, which decides upon the 
United Kingdom staying in the European Union, receives the royal assent and comes into 
force;  
▪ 28th February 2018 – The European Commission publishes the draft of the 
Withdrawal Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom; 
▪ 19 March 2018 – The UK and EU make decisive steps in negotiations. Agreements include 
dates for a transitional period after the Brexit day, the status of EU citizens in the UK before 
and after that time and fishing policy. Nevertheless, thorny issues remain, among which the 
main is about the Northern Ireland’s border; 
▪ 26th June 2018 – The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill receives Royal Assent: the 
European Union Withdrawal Act becomes Act of Parliament; 
▪ 9th July 2018 – Boris Johnson resigns as Foreign Secretary, stating that the Prime Minister 
was leading the UK into a semi-Brexit with the status of a colony. Then David Davis, the 
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Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, also resigns and is replaced by Dominic 
Raab; 
▪ 31st October 2018 – The EU’s chief negotiator says negotiations must be complete before 
the end of October to give the 27 EU countries time to sign off the deal. British MPs, 
moreover, agree to vote on the final deal in the UK Parliament before the 29th of March 
2019; 
▪ 14th November 2018 – Following months of tricky negotiations, the official withdrawal 
agreement is released. However, the deal faces fierce criticism from the opposition as well 
as from within May’s own party; 
▪ 15th November 2018 – Dominic Raab resigns as Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union. Raab, who succeeds David Davis to that position in July, is replaced by Stephen 
Barclay; 
▪ 25th November 2018 – All 27 Member States remaining in the European Union approve 
Theresa May’s Brexit plan, allowing the plan to be submitted to the House of Commons; 
▪ 7th December 2018 – A journalistic inquiry reveals that Northern Ireland might remain in 
the EU permanently if the EU and UK should not find agreement upon trade relationships; 
▪ 10th December 2018 – The Court of Justice of the European Union states that The United 
Kingdom is free to revoke unilaterally the notification of its intention to withdraw from the 
EU. This statement would mean that, under Article 50 of the EU Treaty, the UK could 
legally remain a member of the EU under its current, unchanged terms if it chose to do so; 
▪ 10th December 2018 – The British Parliamentary vote on the Prime Minister May’s EU-
approved Brexit deal is delayed, after initially being scheduled for the 11th of December. 
Theresa May acknowledges that the vote was postponed because it would be rejected by a 
significant margin if put to Parliament; 
▪ 12th December 2018 – The Prime Minister faces– and survives– a vote about the leadership 
of the Conservative Party. Theresa May, furthermore, faces a vote of no-confidence, but 
wins the vote with 200 votes in favor and 117 against; 
▪ 17th December 2018 – Theresa May announces crucial Brexit parliamentary vote for mid-
January 2019. The vote, however, had originally been scheduled for December; 
▪ 7th January 2019 – The vote on Theresa May’s Brexit proposal is finally publically 
announced for Tuesday, January 15th 2019; 
▪ 9th January 2019 – A motion is passed in the House of Commons according to which the 
Prime Minister Theresa May will have to provide a ‘Plan B’ within 3 days, if her Brexit 
Plan is not supported; 
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▪ 15th January 2019 – Theresa May’s Brexit Withdrawal Agreement is resoundingly defeated 
in the House of Commons: with 432 contrary votes against just 202 in favor of the 
agreement, the vote is one of the largest government defeats in British political history. The 
Prime Minister, subsequently, agrees to allow discussion on any parliamentary vote of no-
confidence against the government: one is immediately tabled by the Opposition Leader 
Jeremy Corbyn; 
▪ 16th January 2019 – The Prime Minister survives a parliamentary no confidence vote with 
325 votes in its favor against 306 in opposition; 
▪ 29th January 2019 – British MPs support Conservative minister Sir Graham Brady’s Brexit 
amendment with 317 votes in favor against 301 in opposition: the non-binding amendment 
aims at alternative arrangements for the Irish border arrangement backstop proposed in the 
current EU-approved Brexit negotiations. Anyway, the European Union quickly rules out re-
negotiating the current agreement. 
MPs, furthermore, also vote to support a non-binding amendment proposed by the 
Conservative minister Dame Caroline Spelman and the Labor minister Jack Dromey that 
rejects the scenario a no-deal Brexit. The proposal is supported by 318 votes in favor versus 
310 against. 
Sources: www.bbc.com , www.wikitribune.com , www.aljazeera.com ,  www.parliament.uk 
and https://about-britain.com (for more details see the References Section). 
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4. The data 
 
The data used in this analysis were the series of three European stock market indexes: the 
French CAC40, the German DAX30 and the British FTSE100. These indexes are regarded as the 
most comprehensive stock markets indexes for the respective countries and, consequently, the best 
proxies to verify the impact of Brexit on the corresponding stock markets. As for the selected 
countries, France and Germany were chosen as subjects of analysis together with the United 
Kingdom for three main reasons: 
-Implementing a statistical model involves naturally choosing an appropriate sample: in order not to 
have too complicated time-series models with too many coefficients to estimate, I narrowed the 
number of stock markets potentially affected by the Brexit to two; 
-France and Germany may be considered as the main European and Euro economies; 
-France and Germany are some of the most important commercial partners of the United Kingdom. 
This fact is evident from Table I which lists the countries with highest weight in the total UK 
exports. Here it can be seen that France and Germany occupy the first places in the percentage of 
total UK exports. Therefore, it may be conjectured that these countries will be the most affected by 
the Brexit shock and, hence, are in the pole position in a study about financial contagion caused by 
Brexit. 
TABLE I-First ten UK’s importing countries 
 













I began this study by collecting the daily prices of CAC40, DAX30 and FTSE100 from 
Yahoo Finance for the period between the 2nd of January 2012 until the 15th of February 2019. 
The first date was chosen as an approximate stillness date after the sovereign debt crisis and the 
final date as the last information available at the moment of the draft of this work. For each 
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series, the log returns were calculated. Since the stock markets in France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom sometimes open and close irregularly due to national holidays, the data were 
homogenized deleting the days that did not match amongst the series of the log returns. The 
final dataset corresponded to three time-series of log returns from the 4th of January 2012 to the 
15th of February 2019 for a total of 1770 observations for each series. 
For the remaining sections, in order not to weigh the text too much with exhaustive 
algebraic explanations about the mathematical structure of each statistical test and econometric 
model used in the analysis, I preferred giving, as it was considered of benefit for the reader, the 
general intuition to understand the techniques implemented and follow the logical steps in a 
straightforward way.  
The software used to manage the data and obtain the necessary output was EViews 10. 
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5. The analysis 
 
5.1 Analysis of the behavior of the series 
 
The plots of the FTSE100, CAC40 and DAX 30 log returns are illustrated in Figures 1, 2 
and 3, respectively: the horizontal axis represents the years and months included in the sample, 
whereas the vertical axis represents the log-returns in decimals. The graphs of the three series show 
remarkable similarity suggesting intrinsic interdependence among them. All of them, generally 
speaking, show the so-called volatility clustering effect, namely several consecutive observations 
which can be categorized in a high volatility regime followed by many consecutive periods of lower 
volatility and vice-versa. More in detail, the UK returns seems to be more unstable with several 
observations deviating substantially out of the sub-period average after 2015. Germany’s and 
France’s returns, instead, exhibit a more regular pattern but with a noticeable increase in volatility 
during the 2015 and 2016 and, above all, extreme observations around the 24th of June 2016, the day 




FIGURE 1 – Series of 
the FTSE100 log 
returns 
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FIGURE 3 – Series of 
the DAX30 log 
returns 




An important first step to carry out in time-series analysis is to check if the series are 
stationary. A series is (second order) stationary if it has the property that the mean, variance and 
autocorrelation function of its underlying Data Generating Process (DGP) do not change over time. 
 The stationarity was verified through the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test: the null hypothesis 
of the ADF test is that the series has a unique unit root, i.e., has, exactly, one root equal to unity in 
the characteristic equation of the DGP of the series (with the other roots being higher than one, in 
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FIGURE 2 - Series of the 
CAC40 log returns 
Source: EViews 10 
output 
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analyzed series, corresponds to stationarity.  The results of the application of the ADF test to each 
return series in EViews are shown in Tables II-IV: several lag lengths were tested getting the same 
result (rejection of null hypothesis) and  a lag length equal to 24 was finally chosen to test the 
hypothesis of stationarity. Given that the null hypothesis was rejected for each series (p-value lower 
than any reasonable significance level) the statistical evidence suggests that all these series are 
stationary. Given stationarity, this dataset is suitable for the application of the VAR and GARCH 
econometric methodology. 
 
 TABLE II - ADF test for the 
UK's log returns series 
 
 
Source: EViews 10 output 
  
 
Source: Eview 10 output 
  
 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 
Null Hypothesis: FR_LNRET has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 23 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=24)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.495890  0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.433892
5% level -2.862991
10% level -2.567590
Null Hypothesis: GER_LNRET has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 24 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=24)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.375178  0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.433895
5% level -2.862992
10% level -2.567590
Null Hypothesis: UK_LNRET has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 24 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=24)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.969741  0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.433895
5% level -2.862992
10% level -2.567590
TABLE III - ADF test for 
France's log returns 
series                                     
TABLE IV - ADF test for 
Germany's log returns 
series 
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The second basic step, then, was to study the empirical distribution of the returns in order to 
understand which theoretical distribution makes the best fit to these series as this is an important 
input for the class of econometric models I am going to apply. With this purpose, I realized two 
different checks on the series of the mean-adjusted returns (returns minus the sample average). Both 
checks found evidence against the application of the normal distribution to the return series. 
The first check was based on the empirical distribution of the mean-adjusted returns: the 
empirical quantiles of the mean-adjusted returns are plotted against the quantiles of a normal 
distribution, which means that if the observations come from a normal population, then the resulting 
chart should be a perfectly 45-degree line. The resulting charts, which are known as Q-Q plots, are 
illustrated in Figures 4, 5 and 6 for the UK, France and Germany series, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 4 - Q-Q plot of the UK's series of 
mean-adjusted log returns against the 
Normal distribution 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 
The empirical quantiles of the UK’s mean-adjusted returns, as can be seen in Figure 4, deviate 
significantly from the theoretical quantiles of the Normal exhibiting fatter tails suggesting that a 
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FIGURE 5 - Q-Q plot of the France's series 
of mean-adjusted log returns against the 
Normal distribution 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 
FIGURE 6 - Q-Q plot of the Germany's series 
of mean-adjusted log returns against the 
Normal distribution 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 
 
Equally for the case of the United Kingdom, the mean-adjusted return series of France and 
Germany (Figure 5 and Figure 6), show fatter tails than the Normal distribution, which suggests 
that a different distribution allowing for this kind of pattern should be applied. 
Using the same series, I also applied the Jarque-Bera test, whose null hypothesis is that the 
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The Jarque-Bera test verifies whether sample data fit the values of skewness and kurtosis of a 
Normal distribution which are equal, respectively, to 0 and 3.The value of the Jarque-Bera statistic 
must be compared with the critical value of a Chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom: 
the null hypothesis is rejected if the observed value of the test statistic is higher than the critical 
value.   
The EViews outputs of this test are shown in Figure 7. Given that the p-values are always very low 
and, approximately, equal to 0, the null hypothesis in all cases is rejected and evidence is found 




Given that the hypothesis of the Normal distribution is rejected, it is recommended to choose 













Mean       8.04e-20
Median   0.000244
Maximum  0.035062
Minimum -0.047890
Std. Dev.   0.008587
Skew ness  -0.157687
Kurtosis   5.062900
Jarque-Bera  321.1824















Mean      -4.55e-19
Median   0.000126
Maximum  0.046185
Minimum -0.084070
Std. Dev.   0.011207
Skew ness  -0.309771
Kurtosis   6.258978
Jarque-Bera  811.6018












Mean       6.68e-19
Median   0.000402
Maximum  0.048228
Minimum -0.070965
Std. Dev.   0.011183
Skew ness  -0.303488
Kurtosis   5.083213
Jarque-Bera  347.2296
Probability  0.000000 
Germany
FIGURE 7 - The null 
hypothesis of 
normality is rejected in 
the Jarque-Bera test 
for each series 
Source: EViews 10 
output 
 
THE BREXIT: A CASE OF FINANCIAL CONTAGION? 
22 
 
that both checks gave evidence of fat tails, a reasonable specification can be a Student’s t-
distribution. Q-Q plots of the mean-adjusted returns against the Student’s t-distribution are shown 
in Figures 8, 9 and 10. Using the same approach as in the first test afore-mentioned, it can be 
noticed that the quantiles of the mean-adjusted returns against the theoretical quantiles of a 
Student’s t-distribution display a better fit. In the case of the United Kingdom (Figure 8) the fitting 
is almost perfect with the exception of a slight deviation in the extreme quantiles. 
  
In the case of France (Figure 9), the fitting improves too, but not as much as in the case of the 






























United Kingdom FIGURE 8 - Q-Q plot of the UK's 
series of mean-adjusted log returns 
against the Student’s t-distribution 
Source: EViews 10 output 





Finally, in the case of Germany (Figure 10), we also observe deviations, especially in the upper 
extreme, but the fitting improves slightly. Hence, in summary, I consider this as evidence that 































































FIGURE 9 - Q-Q plot of the 
France's series of mean-adjusted 
log returns against the Student’s t-
distribution 
Source: EViews 10 output 
FIGURE 10 - Q-Q plot of the 
Germany's series of mean-
adjusted log returns against the 
Student’s t-distribution 
Source: EViews 10 output 
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5.2 Estimation of a VAR model 
 
As previously seen on the graphs of the log-returns (Figures 1, 2 and 3), it is possible to 
notice a common pattern amongst the three series due to the tight relationships between the 
financial markets of these countries. In order to allow for the existing interdependence without the 
need of specifying a detailed economic model, I applied the VAR methodology to the three series 
under analysis, the log-returns of FTSE100, CAC40 and DAX30.  
A VAR model is a system of simultaneous equations which represents the multivariate 
generalization of an univariate AR model : a k -variable vector autoregression of order p, VAR(p ), 
is a system of k linear equations, with each equation describing the dynamics of one variable as a 
linear function of the previous p lags of every variable in the system, including its own p lags.  
The general equation of a VAR(p) over the sample period is, therefore,  
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡              for  t = 1, …, T              (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a k-vector (or a k x 1 matrix) of endogenous variables, i.e., the i
th element at time t is yi,t; 
𝑐 is a k-vector of constants (i.e. the intercepts); Ai is a time-invariant (k x k)-matrix; yt-i is the 
(lagged) observation at i periods back; and et is a k-vector (or a k x 1 matrix) of unobservable i.i.d. 
zero-mean error terms, i.e., E(et) = 0 (white noise).  
In the context of our analysis, the estimation of a VAR model to these three returns series 
demands the choice of the order p, which represents the number of lags, and that the stability 
condition of VAR models is satisfied. 
Table V shows the values of different information criteria according the VAR lag order. The 
selection of the lag order was driven by the minimization of the information criteria, as it is standard 
in the literature. Hence, I selected a VAR model with one lag as this is the lag that minimizes most 
of the information criteria as seen in Table V.  
 





Thus, in summary, the equation (1) can be expressed explicitly for the particular case of this 
analysis as a system of k = 3 equations, p = 1 order of lag, and T = 1769 observations (i.e., the total 






𝑦𝑈𝐾,𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1,1𝑦𝑈𝐾,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1,2𝑦𝐹𝑅,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1,3𝑦𝐺𝐸𝑅,𝑡−1 + 𝑒1,𝑡
4
𝑦𝐹𝑅,𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2,1𝑦𝑈𝐾,𝑡−1 + 𝑎2,2𝑦𝐹𝑅,𝑡−1 + 𝑎2,3𝑦𝐺𝐸𝑅,𝑡−1 + 𝑒2,𝑡
  
𝑦𝐺𝐸𝑅,𝑡 = 𝑐3 + 𝑎3,1𝑦𝑈𝐾,𝑡−1 + 𝑎3,2𝑦𝐹𝑅,𝑡−1 + 𝑎3,3𝑦𝐺𝐸𝑅,𝑡−1 + 𝑒3,𝑡
                               (2) 
where, respectively, the left-hand side of each equations represents the observation at time t of the 
log-returns of the FTSE100, CAC40 and DAX30 analyzed in Section 5.1.  
As for the second step, with a reasoning similar to the one that supported the check for 
stationarity in the time-series samples of log returns,  it was necessary to verify if the roots of the 
VAR (1) characteristic polynomial equation were inside the unit circle: in case they were not, the 
model would be considered as unstable and not suitable to carry out a statistical inference analysis. 
The calculation of the roots (Table VI) proved the model to be stable and, therefore, suitable to 
continue the analysis, as shown here below graphically (Figure 11). 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: FR_LNRET UK_LNRET GER_LNRET 
Exogenous variables: C 
Date: 03/02/19   Time: 11:49
Sample: 1/04/2012 2/15/2019
Included observations: 1762
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0  19525.51 NA  4.77e-14 -22.15949 -22.15017  -22.15605*
1  19538.89  26.70097   4.75e-14*  -22.16447* -22.15022* -22.15069
2  19540.75  3.689637  4.79e-14 -22.15635 -22.09111 -22.13224
3  19546.61  11.65373  4.81e-14 -22.15279 -22.05958 -22.11835
4  19557.51   21.65338*  4.80e-14 -22.15495 -22.03379 -22.11018
5  19565.40  15.63004  4.80e-14 -22.15369 -22.00456 -22.09858
6  19570.89  10.85111  4.82e-14 -22.14970 -21.97261 -22.08426
7  19572.51  3.214874  4.86e-14 -22.14133 -21.93628 -22.06556
8  19577.19  9.227260  4.88e-14 -22.13643 -21.90342 -22.05032
TABLE V - Lag order 
selection for VAR model 
Source: EViews 10 output 
TABLE VI - Modulus of each root 
lies inside the unit circle 
Source: EViews 10 output 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial
Endogenous variables: FR_LNRET
        UK_LNRET GER_LNRET 
Exogenous variables: C 
Lag specification: 1 1
Date: 03/02/19   Time: 11:53
     Root Modulus
-0.032044 - 0.050350i  0.059682
-0.032044 + 0.050350i  0.059682
 0.052758  0.052758
 No root lies outside the unit circle.
 VAR satisfies the stability condition.








For completeness, it is possible to check the whole output of the VAR (1) estimation in Table VII 
available in the Annexes section. 
 
 
5.3 Estimation of a GARCH model 
 
After taking into consideration the interdependence through a VAR model, it is necessary to 
model the conditional autoregressive heteroskedasticity (ARCH effects) of the DGP as this is a 
pattern regularly observed in financial time series. In fact, as argued in Section 5.1, the time-series 
exhibit volatility clustering which is likely to generate these ARCH effects. To do so, I estimated a 
MGARCH (1,1) model simultaneously with the VAR (1) model. 
The GARCH model, very briefly, acts as an ARMA1 (Autoregressive Moving Average) 
process for the error variance. 
The general GARCH (p,q), by consequent, can be expressed as 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑡−1
2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑝 𝑡−𝑝
2 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑡−1
2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑞𝜎𝑡−𝑞
2                                            (3) 
                                                          
1 The notation ARMA (p, q) refers to the model with p autoregressive terms and q moving-average terms. Thus, this 
model contains the AR (p) model and the MA (q) model. Generally speaking, an ARMA (p, q) model has the following 
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Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
FIGURE 11 - Inverse roots of VAR 
polynomial characteristic equation 
inside the unit circle 
Source: EViews 10 output 
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where, p is the lag order of the squared error ε2 and q is the lag order of the variance σ2: the first part 
of the equation (3) up to 𝛼𝑝 𝑡−𝑝
2  is the ARCH (p) part, whereas the remaining part up to 𝛽𝑞𝜎𝑡−𝑞
2  is 
the GARCH (q) part. Typically, given a process { 𝑡}t for the stock returns, the hypothesis is that     
εt = σtzt , where zt ~  N(0,1)  for every t and σt follows the equation, or the ARCH part of it, as 
expressed in (3). 
 The MGARCH model is the multivariate extension of the univariate GARCH model which 
allows the conditional-on-past-history covariance matrix of the endogenous variables to follow a 
flexible dynamic structure. 
The general equation of a MGARCH model (vech representation) as presented by Engle and 
Kroner (1995) can be written as follows: 
{




                                                                                                          (4) 
where, yt is a k-vector of dependent variables, C is a k x m parameter matrix, xt is a k-vector of 
explanatory variables, possibly including lags of yt, 𝑯𝑡
1
2 is the Cholesky2 factor of time-varying 
conditional matrix Ht, and νt is a k-vector of zero-mean, unit-variance i.i.d. innovations. For general 
purposes, Ht is a matrix generalization of univariate GARCH models, i.e., it is the symmetric 
conditional covariance matrix and it satisfies the following properties: 
1. Diagonal elements of Ht must be strictly positive; 
2. The matrix Ht is positive-definite3; 
3. Stationarity: E[Ht] exists, finite and constant with regard to t. 
 For instance, a MGARCH (1,1) model can be expressed as  
𝑣𝑒𝑐ℎ(𝑯𝑡) = 𝑠 + 𝑨 𝑣𝑒𝑐ℎ( 𝑡−1 𝑡−1
′ ) + 𝑩 𝑣𝑒𝑐ℎ(𝑯𝑡−1)                                             (5) 
where, vech denotes the vector-half operator, which stacks the lower triangular elements of a N x N 
matrix as an a [N (N + 1) / 2] x 1 vector. For example, let M a (2 x 2) matrix, then vech (M) is  
                                                          
2 Every positive-definite matrix A ϵ Rnxn can be factored as A = RTR, where R is upper triangular with positive diagonal 
elements. R is called the Cholesky factor of A and can be interpreted as the “square root” of a positive definite matrix.  
 
3 A symmetric matrix A ϵ Rnxn is positive definite if xTAx > 0 for all x ≠ 0. 
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]                                                                                                     (6) 
Given that the conditional covariance matrix Ht is symmetric, vech (Ht) contains all the unique 
elements in Ht.  



























]   (7) 
As the example of equation (7) shows that the even simpler MGARCH model suffers the so-called 
curse of dimensionality, i.e., even for low dimensions of N and p and q, the number of parameters to 
estimate is very large. Precisely, the number is: 1 + (p + q)[ N (N + 1)/ 2]2.               
 The lag orders (MGARCH (1,1)) was selected based on the concept of parsimony: the 
GARCH (1,1) is parsimonious in terms of coefficients to estimate but empirical evidence also 
systematically suggests that a simple GARCH (1,1) is enough to describe most of the volatility 
dynamics present in financial time series: an ARCH (p), effectively, is equivalent to a GARCH 




2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑡−1
2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑝 𝑡−𝑝
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾1 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑡−1
2                             (8) 
There are several different MGARCH models: the various MGARCH models basically 
provide alternative restrictions on the matrix H. Many of them were estimated for the purpose of 
this work and I decided to choose the one which minimized the information criteria. 
I concentrated my experimentation on four kinds of MGARCH models: MGARCH-BEKK, 
MGARCH-BEKK (TARCH), MGARCH-DIAGVECH and MGARCH-DIAGVECH (TARCH). I 
ignored the MGARCH-CCC (Constant Conditional Correlations) given that it was not expected, 
reasonably, the correlation to stay constant through the years of the analysis.  
Generally speaking, TARCH (Threeshold ARCH) models account for the fact that negative 
innovations have often greater impact in financial markets’ volatility than positive innovations. A 
GARCH-TARCH (1,1) model can be, therefore, expressed as follows: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾1𝑑𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                               (9) 
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where, dt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to zero if εt-1 ≥ 0, and equal to one if εt-1 < 0.  
 The diagonal-Vech MGARCH is built such that each element of the conditional covariance matrix 
follows a univariate GARCH model. More precisely, this model, as formulated by Bollerslev, Engle 
and Wooldridge (1988) restricts the matrixes A and B as presented in (5) to be diagonal. By 
consequent, the number of parameters to estimate are fewer than the general case: this restriction 
reduced the number of estimates to [N (N + 1) / 2] (1 + p + q). Under the afore-mentioned 
restrictions, the general diagonal VEC model for each variance-covariance term can be written 
following the example of Minović and Simeunović (2008): 
ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑗 +∑𝑎ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑝
ℎ=1
𝑖,𝑡−ℎ 𝑗,𝑡−ℎ + ∑𝑏ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑞
ℎ=1
ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡−ℎ                   1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘  
The equation (10) for the DIAGVECH (1,1) model reduces to: 
ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝑎𝑖𝑗 𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1                                                                   (11) 
For the sake of simplicity and completeness, here follows the matrix representation for a 




























 The BEKK model, finally, is a multivariate model in which the elements of the conditional 
covariance matrix arise from quadratic form, reason why such matrix is always positive-definite 
under general conditions. The positive-definite parametrization as proposed by Engle and Kroner 
(1995) is the following: 
𝑯𝑡 = 𝑪𝑪














where C, Aik and Bik are (N x N) matrices. More in particular, the intercept is the product 𝑪𝑪′, where 
C is a lower triangular matrix4, and without any further assumption 𝑪𝑪′ is positive semi-definite5. 
The values of the information criteria for each considered model are reported below in Table VIII. 
                                                          
4 A square matrix is called lower triangular if all the entries above the main diagonal are zero.  
5 A symmetric matrix A ϵ Rnxn is positive semi-definite if xTAx ≥ 0 for all x. 
(10) 
(13) 





As visible, the model which minimizes most of the information criteria is the MGARCH 
DIAGVECH and, for this reason, I selected this model to continue my analysis. The detail of the 
whole model specification is given in Table IX available in the Annexes section. 
 A reasonable criterion to check if a given model of the ARCH class is suitable for analysis is 
to perform diagnostic checking procedures to the residuals of the estimated model. In particular, an 
empirical practitioner should verify if ARCH effects are still active in the residual series. In case 
there are ARCH effects, one may perceive the model as adequate to pursue with the econometric 
analysis.  
To detect the absence or the presence of remaining ARCH effects in the residuals, I applied the 
Portmanteau test with the Cholesky orthogonalization. Under this framework, the Portmanteau Test 
sets the absence of remaining ARCH effects in the residuals as the null hypothesis. Hence the null 
favors the application of the model under analysis as it is considered well specified. The alternative 
hypothesis is more loosely specified as this test as power against a range of possible alternatives, in 
particular, the presence of ARCH effects. The Portmanteau Test, therefore, allows checking how a 
model matches with the dataset when there exist many ways in which the model can deviate from 
the DGP.   
The results of the application of a sequence of Portmanteau tests are shown in Table X.  The results 
and interpretations of this test show no evidence of any remaining residual ARCH effects in the 
estimated model.  
MGARCH DIAGVECH
Log likelihood  19930.29 Schwarz criterion -22.40178
Avg. log likelihood  3.755472 Hannan-Quinn criter. -22.46232
Akaike info criterion -22.49778
MGARCH DIAGVECH TARCH
Log likelihood  19890.97 Schwarz criterion -22.41652
Avg. log likelihood  3.748063 Hannan-Quinn criter. -22.44971
Akaike info criterion -22.46916
MGARCH BEKK
Log likelihood  19888.28 Schwarz criterion -22.40078
Avg. log likelihood  3.747555 Hannan-Quinn criter. -22.43984
Akaike info criterion -22.46272
MGARCH BEKK TARCH
Log likelihood  19906.33 Schwarz criterion -22.40851
Avg. log likelihood  3.750956 Hannan-Quinn criter. -22.45342
Akaike info criterion -22.47973
TABLE VIII - Information criteria 
coefficients for all the MGARCH 
models considered in the analysis 
Source: EViews 10 output 







5.4 The conditional correlations and volatilities 
 
Since the estimated VAR-MGARCH model seems to be well specified as argued in section 
5.3, the following step was to extract the key variables for the financial contagion analysis 
following Brexit, namely the conditional correlation estimates for each pair of countries and the 
conditional standard deviation estimates for each country. 
As the conditional correlation graphs suggest in Figure 12 (on the horizontal axis the years 
and months included in the sample, whereas on the vertical axis the value of conditional 
correlations), after the beginning of 2015 the values of all countries analyzed show more turbulence, 
especially during 2016 and starting from 2018. Moreover, correlations that involve the United 
Kingdom exhibit a more unstable pattern compared to the correlations between France and 
Germany. 
 
System Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
Date: 03/10/19   Time: 10:43
Sample: 1/05/2012 2/15/2019
Included observations: 1769
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df
1  4.063142  0.9072  4.065440  0.9071 9
2  6.746472  0.9921  6.751808  0.9921 18
3  17.36333  0.9218  17.38670  0.9211 27
4  28.99853  0.7898  29.04827  0.7878 36
5  37.53815  0.7774  37.61209  0.7748 45
6  45.88310  0.7761  45.98545  0.7728 54
7  47.67485  0.9242  47.78431  0.9226 63
8  54.01703  0.9439  54.15531  0.9423 72
9  61.07529  0.9518  61.24966  0.9501 81
10  70.87571  0.9319  71.10580  0.9293 90
11  88.60024  0.7639  88.94122  0.7558 99
12  102.1119  0.6415  102.5452  0.6301 108
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the System lag order.
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution
TABLE X - Test for residual ARCH 
in the selected VAR-MGARCH 
model 
Source: EViews 10 output 





Likewise, the charts of the conditional standard deviations displayed in Figure 13 (on the 
horizontal axis the years and months included in the sample, whereas on the vertical axis the value 
of conditional standard deviations) below show an abrupt increase during the last trimester of 2015 
and the first semester of 2016 in all countries, period of time during which the markets had been 
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FIGURE 12 - Conditional correlation 
estimates from the VAR-MGARCH 
model for the series of log returns of the 
United Kingdom, France and Germany 
Source: EViews 10 output 
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Conditional Standard Deviation FIGURE 13 - Conditional standard 
deviation estimates from the VAR-
MGARCH model for the series of log 
returns of the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany 
Source: EViews 10 output 
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5.5 The test 
 
With the conditional correlations and standard deviations obtained from the VAR-
MGARCH model selected in Section 5.3 it was possible to implement a test to check the occurrence 
of financial contagion due to the Brexit shock.  
I ran a test based on a dummy variable equal to 1 on all dates presented in section 3 and 0 on 
the remaining days. In order to verify whether or not there were significant differences between 
periods with more density of information related to the Brexit, I ran for both the conditional 
correlations and the conditional standard deviations an OLS regression in which the independent 
variables were the Brexit dummy and a constant: if the Brexit-related information is significant for 
the behavior of the conditional correlations and standard deviations throughout time, then the t-
statistic referred to the coefficient of the dummy variable must be statistically significant. The 
model, thus, takes the following specification: 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛿𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡                                         (14) 
 Tables XI until XVI show the EViews outputs of the application of this test to the 
conditional correlations and standard deviations. In all EViews outputs the name Value identifies 
the Brexit dummy variable. 
Starting with the three conditional correlations, the test in all cases resulted in a statistically 
significant coefficient for the dummy variable, at 1% level. Hence, I found strong statistical 
evidence that the events related to the Brexit had a relevant impact, either an increase or a decrease, 




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
VALUE -0.043938 0.012042 -3.648705 0.0003
C 0.823182 0.001856 443.6384 0.0000
R-squared 0.007478     Mean dependent var 0.822139
Adjusted R-squared 0.006916     S.D. dependent var 0.077378
S.E. of regression 0.077110     Akaike info criterion -2.286027
Sum squared resid 10.50661     Schwarz criterion -2.279834
Log likelihood 2023.991     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.283739
F-statistic 13.31305     Durbin-Watson stat 0.029532
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000271
TABLE XI - Estimation of OLS 
regression for the conditional 
correlation between the United 
Kingdom and France through 
the Brexit dummy 
Source: EViews 10 output 
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In the case of the correlation between the United Kingdom and France (Table XI), the dummy 
variable is significant for any level of significance and has negative coefficient. Hence, evidence is 
found that the occurrence of Brexit events reduces the correlation between the countries compared 
to the pattern in “normal” periods. 
 
 
Likewise, in the case of Germany and the United Kingdom (Table XII), the dummy coefficient was 
statistically significant and show evidence of a decrease in the correlation value following a Brexit 
event. 
Finally, in the case of indirect effects of Brexit upon France and Germany (Table XIII), the dummy 




By applying the same approach to the conditional standard deviations, I checked the 
statistical significance of the Brexit dummy for the conditional standard deviations.  
In this case, the model to estimate is: 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛿𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡                          (15) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
VALUE -0.042335 0.013402 -3.158868 0.0016
C 0.789629 0.002065 382.3778 0.0000
R-squared 0.005615     Mean dependent var 0.788624
Adjusted R-squared 0.005053     S.D. dependent var 0.086035
S.E. of regression 0.085818     Akaike info criterion -2.072054
Sum squared resid 13.01337     Schwarz criterion -2.065861
Log likelihood 1834.732     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.069766
F-statistic 9.978448     Durbin-Watson stat 0.025935
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001611
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
VALUE -0.013496 0.005068 -2.662889 0.0078
C 0.916257 0.000781 1173.318 0.0000
R-squared 0.003997     Mean dependent var 0.915936
Adjusted R-squared 0.003433     S.D. dependent var 0.032508
S.E. of regression 0.032452     Akaike info criterion -4.016950
Sum squared resid 1.860940     Schwarz criterion -4.010756
Log likelihood 3554.992     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.014662
F-statistic 7.090977     Durbin-Watson stat 0.041798
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007818
 
TABLE XII - Estimation of OLS 
regression for the conditional 
correlation between the 
United Kingdom and 
Germany through the Brexit 
dummy 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 
TABLE XIII- Estimation of OLS 
regression for the conditional 
correlation between France and 
Germany through the Brexit 
dummy 
Source: EViews 10 output 
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For France (Table XIV) the inclusion of the Brexit dummy results in a statistically significant 
coefficient at 1% significance level, suggesting that volatility shifts on these two stock market 
indexes could be explained by Brexit-related announcements. 
 
 
For Germany (Table XV), the dummy variable is statistically significant at 2% level as shown in 




As for the United Kingdom (Table XVI), instead, the inclusion of the Brexit information through 
the dummy does not show statistical significance: it may be the case that the Brexit information 
may be endogenous in the originating country resulting in not statistically significant coefficients. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
VALUE -0.001657 0.000526 -3.149933 0.0017
C 0.011317 8.10E-05 139.6382 0.0000
R-squared 0.005584     Mean dependent var 0.011278
Adjusted R-squared 0.005021     S.D. dependent var 0.003377
S.E. of regression 0.003368     Akaike info criterion -8.547778
Sum squared resid 0.020046     Schwarz criterion -8.541585
Log likelihood 7562.510     Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.545490
F-statistic 9.922076     Durbin-Watson stat 0.018651
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001660
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
VALUE -0.001216 0.000499 -2.437480 0.0149
C 0.011253 7.68E-05 146.4443 0.0000
R-squared 0.003351     Mean dependent var 0.011224
Adjusted R-squared 0.002787     S.D. dependent var 0.003198
S.E. of regression 0.003193     Akaike info criterion -8.654405
Sum squared resid 0.018018     Schwarz criterion -8.648212
Log likelihood 7656.821     Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.652117
F-statistic 5.941310     Durbin-Watson stat 0.014256
Prob(F-statistic) 0.014888
TABLE XIV - Estimation of OLS 
regression for the conditional 
standard deviation for France 
through the Brexit dummy 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 
TABLE XV - Estimation of OLS 
regression for the conditional 
standard deviation for Germany 
through the Brexit dummy 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 




 As shown in all the results above, the coefficients of the dummy variables for the 
conditional standard deviations and correlations were significant (with the exception of the 
conditional standard deviation for the United Kingdom), but negative: the negative sign can be 
explained by the fact that, throughout the period considered in the analysis, time intervals with 
information suggesting that the Brexit could result in an orderly process were followed by time 
intervals with information suggesting that the Brexit would be just a disastrous process; the 
continuously and chaotically alternating flows of positive and negative information may have 
caused, if considered as a whole, the sign of the coefficient of the dummy variable to turn (slightly) 
negative. That is why, besides, I decided to create a dummy variable with unitary value just on 
remarkable dates instead of letting it assume unitary value from one date on (e.g., from the 
referendum date on): after the referendum, for instance, there were periods of relative calmness with 
events that could let us forecast a EU-friendlier resolution and, anyway, I also tried letting the 
dummy assume unitary value from the referendum date on, but it always resulted in statistically 
insignificant coefficient for the dummy variables in both estimations of equations (14) and (15). 
Finally, the explanation given in this analysis for the negative estimated coefficients seem to be 
sound given that the negative sign would not disappear even if I added the first lag of conditional 
correlations and standard deviations in the right-handed side of equations (14) and (15), 
respectively.  Such seesawing pattern, that may have affected the dummy coefficients, can be better 
understood by looking at the next results that follow. 
 In order to corroborate the results just presented and detail the Brexit events that caused 
a significant variation on the analyzed variables, I calculated the averages for correlations and 
standard deviations for sub-samples delimited by Brexit-related key events. The results are shown 
in Tables XVII and XVIII. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
VALUE -0.000492 0.000382 -1.285198 0.1989
C 0.008708 5.89E-05 147.7592 0.0000
R-squared 0.000934     Mean dependent var 0.008697
Adjusted R-squared 0.000368     S.D. dependent var 0.002450
S.E. of regression 0.002449     Akaike info criterion -9.184946
Sum squared resid 0.010600     Schwarz criterion -9.178753
Log likelihood 8126.085     Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.182658
F-statistic 1.651735     Durbin-Watson stat 0.009772
Prob(F-statistic) 0.198891
TABLE XVI - Estimation of OLS 
regression for the conditional 
standard deviation for the United 
Kingdom through the Brexit dummy 
Source: EViews 10 output 
 





As can be seen in Table XVII, the values of the interval average conditional standard deviations as 
from the 7th May 2016 until the 13th July 2016 rise remarkably and rapidly touching, at the end of 
this run, levels 50% higher than the levels of the pre-Brexit calmness (the first interval in the table) 
in all the three cases. The events triggering such abrupt increase are David Cameron’s general 
elections victory with a manifesto for a referendum on the United Kingdom’s stay in the European 
Union (7th May 2015), the Brexit referendum (22nd June 2016) and pro-Brexit Theresa May’s 
government’s birth (13th July 2016).  
After the shock represented by the Brexit referendum, the values rapidly plummets and, on average, 
start descending until the interval between the 28th February 2018, when the European Commission 
publishes the draft of the Withdrawal Agreement between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom, and the 28th June 2018, when the European Union Withdrawal Act becomes Act of 
Parliament after receiving the Royal Assent: the values grows fast by 23%, 15%  and 26% 
respectively for the UK, France and Germany as compared to the previous interval. 
Finally, a decreasing pattern is again observed until the last interval considered in the table: starting 
from the 7th December 2018, when the Northern Ireland’s backstop issue is revealed, the standard 
deviations for each series start again rearing up to levels similar to those of the periods around the 
referendum and about 30% higher than the values in the immediately earlier interval. 
 As for the average conditional correlations, a similar pattern can be detected (Table 
XVIII). 
The pre-crisis level in the first interval shows high correlation due to the intrinsically strong 
economic interdependence between the pairs of countries.  
Average conditional standard deviations
 Interval UK FR GER
05/01/2012-22/01/2013 0,0091 0,0135 0,0120
23/01/2013-21/05/2014 0,0078 0,0104 0,0098
22/05/2014-10/10/2014 0,0058 0,0085 0,0091
13/10/2014-06/05/2015 0,0094 0,0127 0,0128
07/05/2015-22/02/2016 0,0120 0,0158 0,0163
23/02/2016-22/06/2016 0,0124 0,0153 0,0156
23/06/2016-13/07/2016 0,0140 0,0192 0,0182
14/07/2016-18/12/2016 0,0073 0,0090 0,0089
19/12/2017-27/02/2018 0,0065 0,0074 0,0081
28/02/2018-25/06/2018 0,0080 0,0085 0,0102
26/06/2018-06/12/2018 0,0079 0,0084 0,0095
07/12/2018-15/02/2019 0,0102 0,0111 0,0119
TABLE XVII - Average 
conditional standard 
deviations for time sub-
samples for the United 
Kingdom, France and 
Germany 
Source: Personal elaboration 
from EViews 10 output 
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In the sub-samples prior to the formation of David Cameron’s government (7th May 2015), the 
trends seem to slightly swing. Then, after Cameron’s victory, passing through the Brexit 
referendum, until Theresa May’s new pro-Brexit governments all the three correlations hit the 
highest levels: in the cases of the correlations UK-Germany and UK-France the peak is reached 
immediately before the referendum, maybe because of the expectations created by the market about 
the result of the vote, whereas in the case of the correlation between France and Germany, the peak 
is reached exactly after the referendum date. 
To follow, as in the case of the conditional standard deviations previously seen, after the drop 
registered once that Theresa May’s government is formed (13th July 2017), a new rise in the level of 
correlations between the United Kingdom and Germany and the United Kingdom and France occurs 
between the 28th February 2018 and the 26th June 2018, day on which the Royal Assent turns the 
Withdrawal Act into law. Nevertheless, such increase is not found in the France-Germany 
correlation, which remains stable. 




 All the empirical evidence just described both for the correlations and standard 
deviations matches with the basic points presented at the beginning of the analysis about the 
relationships among volatility, correlation and financial contagion: extremely high levels of 
volatility that spill over from one country to another causing a general and contemporary increase in 
volatility for other countries, higher than average levels of correlation in more markets at the same 
Average conditional correlations
 Interval GER-UK FR-UK FR-GER
05/01/2012-22/01/2013 0,8464 0,8702 0,9131
23/01/2013-21/05/2014 0,8150 0,8303 0,9110
22/05/2014-10/10/2014 0,8159 0,8259 0,8966
13/10/2014-06/05/2015 0,7792 0,8381 0,9283
07/05/2015-22/02/2016 0,8371 0,8763 0,9507
23/02/2016-22/06/2016 0,8703 0,9060 0,9522
23/06/2016-13/07/2016 0,8537 0,8546 0,9735
14/07/2016-18/12/2016 0,6929 0,7365 0,9020
19/12/2017-27/02/2018 0,6164 0,6707 0,9080
28/02/2018-25/06/2018 0,7962 0,8416 0,8985
26/06/2018-06/12/2018 0,7631 0,8070 0,9062
07/12/2018-15/02/2019 0,8422 0,8715 0,9087
TABLE XVIII - Average 
conditional correlations 
for time sub-samples for 
the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany 
Source: Personal elaboration 
from EViews 10 output 
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time in concurrence with high levels of volatility, abrupt and sensitive changes in correlations and 
volatilities in absolute terms in a relatively brief period of time. 




The decision by the United Kingdom of rejecting the membership in the European Union was a 
shock from many points of view. My objective with this work was to verify whether it was also a 
financial shock capable of producing contagion to the Euro area. In order to do so, I selected France 
and Germany as the representative Euro terms of comparison for the analysis. Then, after 
homogenizing the series of the log-returns of the British, French and German stock indexes and 
checking that they were suitable for an econometric analysis, I estimated a VAR-MGARCH model 
to extract the conditional correlations and standard deviations: this way, it was possible to model the 
effects of interdependence and heteroskedasticity between countries and through time. Finally, by 
using a dummy variable approach which tracked the most relevant Brexit-related information, I 
tested the relationships between the conditional correlations and standard deviations with the main 
Brexit events: the test showed evidence of statistical significance of the Brexit news. Moreover, the 
analysis of the time averages of conditional correlations and standard deviations corroborated the 
result of the test. The analysis, therefore, showed evidence of financial contagion in the Eurozone 
caused by the Brexit. 
However, this work must be considered as a humble attempt to understand one of the most 
complicated process of our current days. The present paper, in effect, has several limitations: in the 
sample period and stock markets that could be expanded and, mainly, the construction of the 
conditional correlations and standard deviations which could be estimated through the specification 
of a more complex, and maybe complete, model. More in detail, the VAR estimation could include 
exogenous variables and the MGARCH variance equation could be better modelled by including, 
for instance, the dummy variable as potential regressor. Even though it is likely the Brexit to be a 
contagion case, the contrary may have some evidence. 
Further research on this topic could, for instance, take into account more stock markets and a 
wider period of time as well as try resorting to the most recent econometric models to get more 
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TABLE VII - Estimation of a VAR(1) model for the series of log returns of the United Kingdom, 
















Date: 03/02/19   Time: 11:52
Sample (adjusted): 1/05/2012 2/15/2019
Included observations: 1769 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
FR_LNRET UK_LNRET GER_LNRET
FR_LNRET(-1)  0.071296  0.108557  0.117824
 (0.06885)  (0.05276)  (0.06871)
[ 1.03548] [ 2.05760] [ 1.71492]
UK_LNRET(-1) -0.053494 -0.041602 -0.106628
 (0.05793)  (0.04439)  (0.05781)
[-0.92339] [-0.93718] [-1.84455]
GER_LNRET(-1) -0.061485 -0.081465 -0.041024
 (0.06356)  (0.04871)  (0.06343)
[-0.96729] [-1.67257] [-0.64678]
C  0.000242  9.86E-05  0.000293
 (0.00027)  (0.00020)  (0.00027)
[ 0.90775] [ 0.48291] [ 1.10361]
R-squared  0.001589  0.002473  0.002545
Adj. R-squared -0.000108  0.000777  0.000850
Sum sq. resids  0.221552  0.130083  0.220600
S.E. equation  0.011204  0.008585  0.011180
F-statistic  0.936493  1.458550  1.501180
Log likelihood  5437.368  5908.348  5441.174
Akaike AIC -6.142869 -6.675351 -6.147173
Schwarz SC -6.130482 -6.662964 -6.134786
Mean dependent  0.000235  9.54E-05  0.000298
S.D. dependent  0.011203  0.008588  0.011184
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  4.73E-14
Determinant resid covariance  4.70E-14
Log likelihood  19614.42
Akaike information criterion -22.16215
Schwarz criterion -22.12499
Number of coefficients  12
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  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.067079 0.056356 1.190269 0.2339
C(2) -0.054114 0.045981 -1.176876 0.2392
C(3) -0.047199 0.051157 -0.922616 0.3562
C(4) 0.000639 0.000212 3.007233 0.0026
C(5) 0.088045 0.043001 2.047511 0.0406
C(6) -0.055303 0.036682 -1.507622 0.1317
C(7) -0.046719 0.040713 -1.147512 0.2512
C(8) 0.000366 0.000167 2.184683 0.0289
C(9) 0.098262 0.056412 1.741869 0.0815
C(10) -0.100791 0.047117 -2.139187 0.0324
C(11) -0.016729 0.052243 -0.320211 0.7488
C(12) 0.000745 0.000217 3.427513 0.0006
Variance Equation Coefficients
C(13) 2.72E-06 5.80E-07 4.687490 0.0000
C(14) 1.69E-06 3.73E-07 4.526994 0.0000
C(15) 2.34E-06 5.06E-07 4.624650 0.0000
C(16) 1.62E-06 4.01E-07 4.036914 0.0001
C(17) 1.64E-06 3.81E-07 4.308369 0.0000
C(18) 2.43E-06 5.66E-07 4.305076 0.0000
C(19) 0.046428 0.006047 7.678462 0.0000
C(20) 0.045855 0.005824 7.873784 0.0000
C(21) 0.042240 0.005678 7.439150 0.0000
C(22) 0.046424 0.006294 7.375422 0.0000
C(23) 0.042908 0.005819 7.373631 0.0000
C(24) 0.042061 0.006144 6.846040 0.0000
C(25) 0.924376 0.009626 96.03326 0.0000
C(26) 0.924601 0.009545 96.86617 0.0000
C(27) 0.930058 0.009170 101.4270 0.0000
C(28) 0.926489 0.010452 88.64032 0.0000
C(29) 0.927621 0.009979 92.95512 0.0000
C(30) 0.932706 0.009657 96.58482 0.0000
t-Distribution (Degree of Freedom) 
C(31) 8.162898 0.842240 9.691886 0.0000
Log likelihood 19930.29 Schwarz criterion -22.40178
Avg. log likelihood 3.755472 Hannan-Quinn criter. -22.46232
Akaike info criterion -22.49778
Equation: FR_LNRET = C(1)*FR_LNRET(-1) + C(2)*UK_LNRET(-1) + C(3)
        *GER_LNRET(-1) + C(4)
R-squared 0.000212     Mean dependent var 0.000235
Adjusted R-squared -0.001487     S.D. dependent var 0.011203
S.E. of regression 0.011212     Sum squared resid 0.221857
Durbin-Watson stat 2.014965
Equation: UK_LNRET = C(5)*FR_LNRET(-1) + C(6)*UK_LNRET(-1) + C(7)
        *GER_LNRET(-1) + C(8)
R-squared 0.001152     Mean dependent var 9.54E-05
Adjusted R-squared -0.000546     S.D. dependent var 0.008588
S.E. of regression 0.008591     Sum squared resid 0.130256
Durbin-Watson stat 1.998200
Equation: GER_LNRET = C(9)*FR_LNRET(-1) + C(10)*UK_LNRET(-1) +
        C(11)*GER_LNRET(-1) + C(12)
R-squared 0.000749     Mean dependent var 0.000298
Adjusted R-squared -0.000950     S.D. dependent var 0.011184
S.E. of regression 0.011190     Sum squared resid 0.220998
Durbin-Watson stat 2.014766
Covariance specification: Diagonal VECH
GARCH = M + A1.*RESID(-1)*RESID(-1)' + B1.*GARCH(-1)
M is an indefinite matrix
A1 is an indefinite matrix
B1 is an indefinite matrix*
Transformed Variance Coefficients
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
M(1,1) 2.72E-06 5.80E-07 4.687490 0.0000
M(1,2) 1.69E-06 3.73E-07 4.526994 0.0000
M(1,3) 2.34E-06 5.06E-07 4.624650 0.0000
M(2,2) 1.62E-06 4.01E-07 4.036914 0.0001
M(2,3) 1.64E-06 3.81E-07 4.308369 0.0000
M(3,3) 2.43E-06 5.66E-07 4.305076 0.0000
A1(1,1) 0.046428 0.006047 7.678462 0.0000
A1(1,2) 0.045855 0.005824 7.873784 0.0000
A1(1,3) 0.042240 0.005678 7.439150 0.0000
A1(2,2) 0.046424 0.006294 7.375422 0.0000
A1(2,3) 0.042908 0.005819 7.373631 0.0000
A1(3,3) 0.042061 0.006144 6.846040 0.0000
B1(1,1) 0.924376 0.009626 96.03326 0.0000
B1(1,2) 0.924601 0.009545 96.86617 0.0000
B1(1,3) 0.930058 0.009170 101.4270 0.0000
B1(2,2) 0.926489 0.010452 88.64032 0.0000
B1(2,3) 0.927621 0.009979 92.95512 0.0000
B1(3,3) 0.932706 0.009657 96.58482 0.0000
TABLE IX- Estimation of a 
MGARCH-DIAGVECH model for 
the series of log returns of the 
United Kingdom, France and 
Germany 
Source: EViews 10 output 
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